How do governments deal with the infodemic?
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We are happy to share a summary of a research that was conducted by Ofir Barel on how governments dealt with disinformation before and during the Covid-19 pandemic. Ofir Barel is a researcher in the Yuval Ne’eman Workshop for Science, Technology and Security
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Introduction
Over the past two years, governments across the globe have struggled with the unprecedented health, pedagogic and economic challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic. Alongside these problems, states had to cope with a phenomenon described by the World Health Organization as an "infodemic": spreading false information regarding Covid-19, mainly via websites and social media. According to a study published on The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, circulating false information regarding Covid-19 may endanger individuals' health.
During the pre-Covid-19 era, the majority of governmental strategies for countering disinformation were focused chiefly, on preventing or minimizing disruptions of electoral processes. One can agree that threats on democratic procedures, far-reaching as they may be, are less severe than the described outcomes of Covid-19 related disinformation.
Considering the threat, the question arises as to whether nations have adapted their existing strategies in order to tackle disinformation related to Covid-19?
Methodology
The data in this study was gathered from numerous reports on governmental responses, including governmental initiatives aimed at curbing political disinformation, which was the main point of concern prior to 2020 and initiatives aimed at countering disinformation that was specifically related to the pandemic.
The measures were divided into five categories, four of which were presented in a 2018 study by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, which analyzed government responses to the malicious use of social media in 43 countries. The categories include:
1. Measures targeting social media platforms (e.g., content takedowns);
2. Measures targeting offenders (e.g., criminalization and prosecution of spreading disinformation);
3. Measures aimed at empowering citizens, civil society and media organizations (e.g., promoting media literacy);
4. Measures aimed at enhancing government capacity (e.g., parliamentary hearings and monitoring the information ecosystem).
The fifth category includes additional steps, which did not fit into any of the categories mentioned above. For example, Germany published a call on combating online disinformation campaigns related to Covid-19.
Based on the collected data and the above criteria, adjustments in government policies were reviewed based on two parameters: The extent of change in measures applied during the pandemic, compared with pre-pandemic period and the type of change identified in each state’s policy. The changes were coded into four categories, namely expansion, transition, reduction or consistency.
Findings
By the end of 2019, 103 governments had introduced at least one anti-disinformation initiative, while only 81 countries presented initiatives to counter Covid-19 related disinformation during 2020-2021.
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in enforcing disparate types of countermeasures by states, before and since the pandemic outbreak:
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As figure 1 demonstrates, most of the governments focused on legal actions against individuals who produce and/or share disinformation online, both before and during the pandemic (75 and 56, respectively). On the other hand, exercising of steps that are targeting social media platforms and enhancing government capacity has sharply diminished since the pandemic outbreak.
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As figure 2 shows, 30 out of the 58 governments which introduced steps both before and during the pandemic, limited their counter-disinformation policies during the pandemic, compared to pre-pandemic era, while five governments pursued a broader strategy since the outbreak. 14 governments introduced transitions: While the number of measures taken by them before and during the pandemic remains similar, their type of response changed. For example, prior to the outbreak, the Czech Republic established a governmental center for countering hybrid threats and terrorism, which also monitors disinformation campaigns. During the pandemic, the government presented its intention to release a series of videos for refuting disinformation about Covid-19 vaccines. Finally, nine governments have shown full consistency in their policies as the scope and type of their measures during the pandemic remained identical compared to the pre-pandemic era.
Conclusions
The findings presented above show a general trend of governments decreasing their activity against online disinformation. Assuming that the data includes all the relevant policies it can be concluded that most governments perceive their pre-pandemic strategies as adequate in dealing with Covid-19 disinformation. In other words, current governmental strategies do not express a reduction, but rather constitutes a complement to the existing initiatives.
However, the substantial decrease in the share of measures targeting false information published on social media during the Covid-19 era is quite unaccountable, since researchers in Canada found that people who get their news mainly from social media are more likely to have misperceptions about Covid-19.
During the last two years, emergency measures such as imposing restrictions on unvaccinated citizens and quarantines, caused a widespread public opposition, under the claim they violate basic civil liberties. Therefore, a possible explanation is that decision-makers in democratic countries may have hesitated to apply controls targeting social media, in order to avoid further public outrage. This assumption is supported by the fact that during the Covid-19 era, major democracies such as the UK, Australia, Canada, France and Germany abstained from imposing anti-disinformation regulations during the Covid-19 period.
Recommendations
The most comprehensive solution for protecting citizens from the negative consequences of disinformation, without pursuing control over social media activities, is to establish national media literacy programs. Specifically, governments should establish media literacy programs that focus on the minorities and younger people who are more susceptible to believe false information about COVID-19. Advancing media literacy among young people could be achieved by formulating curriculums focused on knowledge, linguistic skills and art. As for minorities, using graphics, songs or other innovative communication methods may help avoid language barriers.
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